Assistant Secretary of the Navy: Preparing for War (1897-1898)

The Strategic Doctrine of Alfred Thayer Mahan

Roosevelt's naval policy was grounded in the strategic thought of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 had been published in 1890. Mahan's central thesis was revolutionary in American strategic thinking: a nation's greatness required naval supremacy. Control of the sea lanes was the foundation of commercial power and national security. The state that achieved naval superiority could project power globally and protect its interests anywhere in the world.

Roosevelt had read Mahan's work and corresponded with him. As Assistant Secretary, Roosevelt promoted Mahan's strategic thought throughout the Navy Department. He understood the challenge facing American naval power: after the Civil War, the American fleet had deteriorated. The Navy consisted primarily of aging wooden ships. Modernization had been sporadic and underfunded. Britain maintained overwhelming naval supremacy. The American Navy could not project power into distant theaters or protect American interests in the Caribbean and Pacific. If the United States aspired to great power status, it needed a modern navy capable of competing with the naval powers of Europe.

"A powerful navy is a guarantee of peace. The surest way to prevent war is to be thoroughly prepared for it." — Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Advocating for Naval Expansion

Roosevelt seized upon Mahan's analysis as strategic justification for naval expansion. In June 1897, he delivered a public speech at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, presenting his case for American naval strength. The speech advocated backing diplomacy with armed force. It articulated Roosevelt's conviction that American security and commercial interests required naval supremacy. He argued that the United States must modernize its fleet, construct modern battleships and armed cruisers, and develop the capacity to project American power globally.

Roosevelt's advocacy achieved concrete results when, in March 1898, Congress authorized emergency defense appropriations. In response to rumors of Spanish military preparations in Cuba, Congress appropriated $50 million for emergency military expenditures. Roosevelt, working with sympathetic members of Congress and benefiting from the emergency context, secured approximately $30 million of this appropriation for naval purposes. The money funded construction of three battleships, sixteen destroyers, fourteen torpedo boats, and numerous smaller vessels. It was an unprecedented investment in naval construction, but Roosevelt convinced Congress that the expenditure was necessary for American security.

The Famous Cable: February 25, 1898

The most consequential action of Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary tenure occurred on February 25, 1898—a day that would prove pivotal in American history. Secretary Long departed his office, leaving Roosevelt in acting capacity. Roosevelt understood that war with Spain was probable, and he recognized that the Asiatic Squadron, the Navy's Pacific force based in Hong Kong, could be crucial to American military operations against Spanish possessions in the Philippines.

That afternoon, with the Secretary away, Roosevelt seized the opportunity to issue strategic orders to Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron. The cable was explicit: "Assemble all warships except Monocacy at Hong Kong. Ensure full coal supplies. See that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands." Roosevelt was setting strategic parameters without the Secretary's explicit authorization. He was instructing the Pacific Squadron to prepare for offensive operations against Spain.

When Secretary Long returned the next day and discovered Roosevelt's actions, he was annoyed but did not rescind the orders. Long's forbearance proved momentous. When war was declared in April 1898, the orders that Roosevelt had issued—without Long's explicit authorization—had already positioned the Asiatic Squadron for decisive action. Commodore Dewey moved on Manila, and the resulting naval battle on May 1, 1898, established American naval dominance in the Pacific and secured the Philippines as an American objective. One cable, sent during a superior's absence, had shaped the course of American military operations.

The USS Maine and the Drift to War

The explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, killed 266 American sailors and created political crisis. The Court of Inquiry found that external explosion—presumably a mine—had detonated the Maine's forward magazine, though the court could not determine the origin of the explosion. Whether Spanish, Cuban insurgent, or accidental, the explosion killed American sailors and created political momentum for war.

Roosevelt, like many Republicans, interpreted the Maine's loss as Spanish responsibility and advocated American military response. He used his position to publicize the need for war preparation. He spoke to journalists about the likely necessity of military action. He worked behind the scenes to ensure that the Navy would be ready when war came. His public advocacy for military response, combined with his administrative actions to prepare the Navy, made him one of the most visible voices calling for war.

Personal Honor and Active Service

As war authorization moved forward in April and May 1898, Roosevelt faced a question of personal honor. He had preached war with Spain extensively. He had advocated for military preparation. He had used his position to push for naval expansion. But now other men were going to fight. Could he remain as Assistant Secretary while others took up arms? Roosevelt believed the answer was no. To preach war and then refuse to participate personally seemed to him a violation of integrity.

On May 15, 1898, Roosevelt submitted his resignation to Secretary Long. Both Long and President McKinley urged him to remain, emphasizing that his organizational talents were needed at the Navy Department. But Roosevelt was adamant: "for the last year I have preached war with Spain and should feel distinctly ashamed ... if I now failed to practice what I preached." He determined to resign and to serve in the field. He contacted Colonel Leonard Wood, an experienced officer, and together they organized the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, which would become known as the Rough Riders. Roosevelt's decision to leave the Assistant Secretary position reflected his conviction that a man who advocated policy must be willing to bear the consequences of that policy. It was a position that would define his understanding of executive responsibility for the rest of his life.